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Abstract 
The number of people on highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) in South 
Africa has risen dramatically from less than 2,000 in October 2003, to almost 
200,000 by the end of 2005. Yet South Africa’s performance in terms of HAART 
coverage is poor both in comparison with other countries and the targets set by 
the government’s own Operational Plan.  This paper shows that the public 
sector HAART ‘rollout’ has been uneven across South Africa’s nine provinces 
and that the role of external assistance from NGOs and funding agencies such 
as the Global Fund and PEPFAR has been substantial. The National Treasury 
appears to have allocated sufficient funding to the Department of Health for a 
larger HAART rollout, but the Health Minister has not mobilised them 
accordingly. Failure to invest sufficiently in human resources – especially 
nurses – is likely to constrain any future increase in the pace of the rollout.  Not 
only does this compromise the health and lives of thousands of people in South 
Africa – it also undermines the chances of achieving international targets to 
increase access to HAART.  
Introduction 
South African AIDS policy has long been characterised by suspicion on the part 
of President Mbeki and his Health Ministers towards antiretroviral therapy 
(Nattrass 2004, 2006).  The current Minister of Health, Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang resisted the introduction of antiretrovirals for mother-to-child 
transmission prevention (MTCTP) until forced to do so by a Constitutional 
Court ruling – and she resisted the introduction of highly active antiretroviral 
therapy (HAART) for AIDS-sick people until a cabinet revolt in late 2003 
forced her to back down on this as well.  Since then, the public sector rollout of 
HAART has gradually gained momentum, but it has been uneven and continues 
to be constrained by a marked absence of political will at high levels.  
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This paper discusses the South African HAART rollout, paying particular 
attention to South Africa’s poor performance both comparatively and in relation 
to the internal targets set by the government’s Operational Plan of late 2003 
(Department of Health 2003). This poses problems not only for South Africa, 
but for the global rollout because half all HAART patients in low- and middle-
income countries live in Sub-Saharan Africa, and of this total, one quarter live in 
South Africa (World Health Organisation 2005a, 2005b). Poor performance in 
South Africa, thus impacts the aggregate performance of global initiatives such 
as the World Health Organisation’s ‘3 by 5’ initiative to treat three million 
people by the end of 2005.  
South African HAART Coverage in Comparative 
Perspective 
Over the past five years, HAART coverage has increased dramatically in 
developing countries – a process that has been aided substantially by the launch 
of the Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (January 2002) and 
the United States President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 
(January 2003). The World Bank has also contributed to the effort through its 
Multi-country HIV/AIDS program for Africa, as has a range of private donors 
including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Clinton Foundation, 
and Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) such as Medécins Sans 
Frontières (MSF) and Absolute Return for Kids (ARK). Largely, as a 
consequence of this unprecedented international effort (energised further by the 
‘3 by 5’ campaign), the number of people on HAART in Sub-Saharan Africa 
rose from 150,000 to 500,000 between June 2004 and June 2005, increasing 
average HAART coverage from 8% to 11% (World Health Organisation 2005a, 
2005b).      
HAART coverage, however, varies substantially from country to country.  
While level of per capita income is important (richer countries can afford higher 
levels of HAART coverage), this is far from being the only factor at work.  
Political commitment and the capacity of the domestic health sectors to ‘scale 
up’ access to HAART is also crucial (World Health Organisation 2005b; 
International Treatment Preparedness Coalition 2005; Kober et al. 2004; 
Kovsted 2005; Stewart et al. 2004).  This, in turn, is affected by the level of 
development and the scale of the HIV epidemic.  Given the many relevant 
factors, the question of political commitment to rolling out HAART needs to be 
addressed by asking whether a country has achieved a relatively large (or small) 
coverage of HAART given its available resources and epidemiological 
challenges.  
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A recent econometric analysis of the determinants of HAART coverage suggests 
that South Africa’s performance is relatively poor given its economic, 
institutional and epidemiological characteristics (Nattrass 2006a).  In other 
words, although South Africa comprises a large share (25%) of the total number 
of Sub-Saharan Africans on HAART (whether in the public, private or not-for-
profit sectors), this comparative analysis indicates that South Africa should be 
performing a lot better than it is with respect to HAART coverage.  Put 
differently, South Africa may have one of the largest HAART programmes (as 
claimed by President Mbeki in his 2006 State of the Nation address (Mbeki 
2006).  However, given its resource endowments, this programme should be 
even bigger.   
As Stephen Lewis, the UN Special Envoy on AIDS puts it: 
“Over the last four years, I have been to every country in East and 
southern Africa, many of them two, three and four times. I can say 
confidently and categorically, that every single country (with the 
exception of newly peaceful Angola, whose borders were closed to 
traffic – and the virus – throughout the civil war) is working harder at 
treatment than is South Africa, with fewer relative resources, and in 
most cases nowhere near the infrastructure or human capacity of 
South Africa. It is a situation which is absolutely mystifying.” (2005: 
187)  
HAART Coverage in South Africa 
South Africa’s premier demographic model (ASSA2003) provides estimates of 
the number of people in the final stages of AIDS, that is, those who are sick with 
AIDS and who do not have long to live unless they obtain HAART.  The model 
also inputs data from various sources on the number of people accessing 
HAART (whether in public, private or not-for-profit sectors), and projects this 
forward into the future.  As can be seen in Figure 1, the number of people on 
HAART has increased sharply (to 124,000 in the middle of 2005) and is 
expected to rise to 791,000 in 2010. The model predicts that it will only be after 
2008 that the number of people on HAART exceeds the number who need 
HAART but are unable to access it.  At this point, HAART coverage will rise 
from 20% in mid 2005 (that is, when only one in five people who need HAART 
are actually receiving it) to over 50%.  
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Figure 1:  Numbers of People needing and obtaining HAART (mid points 
for each year) whether from the Public or the Private Sectors. 
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Source: ASSA2003 demographic model. 
South Africa’s provinces are, of course, very differently endowed and face 
different challenges with regard to HIV/AIDS.  As can be seen in Table 1, the 
Western Cape is in the best position to achieve a high HAART coverage 
because it has the lowest HIV prevalence of any province, the highest number of 
doctors per 100,000 uninsured persons, the second highest Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita and has the highest public sector health expenditure 
per capita.  Its relatively high spending on health (and on doctors) is in part the 
product of its economic and demographic profile, but also of political decisions 
to prioritise health (including the HAART rollout). The fact that the Western 
Cape (in partnership with MSF) launched the first HAART programme as far 
back as May 2001 in defiance of national policy is indicative of the strength of 
this commitment – as is the ongoing effort to secure additional funding from the 
Global Fund and to work in partnership with NGOs such as MSF and ARK. 
According to Eric Goemare (head of MSF in South Africa), his working 
relationship with the Western Cape government has been the ‘best’ he has ever 
had, whereas his relationship with the national South African government, has 
been the ‘worst’ (quoted in Naimak, 2006: 64).  
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Table 1: The Treatment Rollout in the Provinces 
 Start of 
the 
Rollout 
HIV 
prevalence 
(2005) – 
ASSA2003 
Share of 
the total 
popu-
lation 
Doctors 
per 
100,000 
un-
insured 
persons 
(2005) 
Nurses 
per 
100,000 
un-
insured 
persons 
(2005) 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(2003) 
Per 
capita 
govt 
health 
spending 
(R per 
uninsured 
person) 
2004/5 
Total 
HAART 
coverage 
(end of 
2005)* 
EC May 
2004  
9.5% 14.2% 17 108 R12,185 R873 21.8% 
FS May 
2004  
13.7% 6.0% 32 143 R21,437 R1,193 21.0% 
GT April 
2004  
14.3% 20.1% 42 105 R36,913 R1,179 29.6% 
KZN April 
2004  
15.6% 20.7% 27 107 R18,528 R1,017 20.0% 
LP Aug 
2004  
6.7% 12.0% 14 111 R12,040 R829 27.3% 
MP Aug 
2004  
13.3% 7.0% 19 93 R20,499 R774 20.9% 
NC July 
2004  
6.5% 1.9% 38 141 R24,922 R1,238 32.3% 
NW June 
2004  
12.5% 8.0% 13 90 R17,198 R767 24.5% 
WC May 
2001  
5.0% 10.3% 55 106 R30,628 R1,433 55.7% 
Total  11.0% 100% 28 109 R22,569 R1,014 25.2% 
Sources: Statistics South Africa, ASSA2003 demographic model; AIDS Law Project 2005 and South African 
Treasury 2004.  
Notes: * The numbers of people on HAART in the public and private sectors as a percentage of the number of 
people estimated to need HAART (from ASSA2003 demographic model). 
EC: Eastern Cape; FS: Free State; GT: Gauteng; KZN: KwaZulu-Natal; LP: Limpopo; MP: Mpumalanga; NC: 
Northern Cape; NW: North-West; WC: Western Cape. 
It is important to bear in mind that total HAART coverage includes all people on 
HAART, that is, whether they are funded through the public sector, private 
medical schemes, NGOs or out of their own pocket.  As shown in Table 2 as 
well as Figures 5a and 5b (see sections below), at the end of 2005, there were an 
estimated 193,579 people on HAART, of which 57.8% were in the public sector.  
The 48.2% of HAART patients located in the private sector were mainly funded 
through medical schemes (29% of total HAART patients), not-for-profit 
organisations such as NGOs and churches (5.5% of the total), or from their own 
incomes (7.7% of the total).  The following section concentrates specifically on 
the rollout of HAART in the public sector.  
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The Rollout of HAART in the Public Sector 
In October 2003, after a long struggle by many civil society organisations 
including the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and the AIDS Law Project, 
the South African cabinet committed the government to providing HAART 
through the public sector. The following month, the Department of Health 
produced its ‘Operational Plan’ to have 54,004 people on treatment by March 
2004, 197,624 by March 2005, and 453,650 by March 2006 (Department of 
Health 2003). Unfortunately, the Minister of Health, Dr Tshabala-Msimang, was 
far from enthusiastic about this policy shift (seeing it as having been imposed on 
her by cabinet) and to this day, she continues to warn about the dangers of 
taking antiretrovirals (Nattrass 2006b).  
Figure 2: Planned and Actual Growth in the Provision of Antiretroviral 
Treatment 
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Sources: ASSA2003 demographic model; Department of Health 2003 and Hassan and Bosch 2006. 
It is thus probably unsurprising that the HAART rollout proceeded a great deal 
slower than expected by the architects of the Operational Plan, with most 
provinces only starting to provide treatment in mid-2004 (see Table 1 and Figure 
2).  Part of the problem had to do with procrastination by the Health Minister 
with regard to drug procurement. On 2 March 2004, she unveiled her drug 
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procurement timetable to the parliamentary portfolio committee on health 
showing that the earliest that drugs would be available for a public sector rollout 
was July 2004 (and in the end, the tender was only finalised in March 2005).  
The TAC protested about the absence of an interim tender procedure (which 
would enable the provinces to obtain drug supplies), met with the Department of 
Health and then served draft legal papers on the 19 March.  Five days later the 
government announced that provinces could use interim tender procedures and 
begin their rollout.   
Figure 3: Provincial HAART Rollout as a % of the Operational Plan 
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Sources: ASSA2003 demographic model; Department of Health 2003 and Hassan and Bosch 2006. 
However, despite the slow start, the rollout gathered pace, especially in 2005 
once PEPFAR and Global Fund projects came on stream. The number of 
HAART patients in the public sector rose from about 7,000 in mid 2004, to 
112,000 at the end of 2005.  This strong growth of 16% over eighteen months 
was, however, not nearly sufficient to catch up with the original Operational 
Plan targets.  As can be seen in Figure 2, by the end of 2005, the numbers of 
people on HAART in the public sector was still less than 30% of the original 
planned total.  
 8
This overall nationally aggregated performance of course masks some dramatic 
differences between the provinces. As can be seen in Figure 3, the Western Cape 
had already achieved the Operational Plan target by mid 2004, and had exceeded 
it by 2005. Limpopo, by contrast, had only reached 12% of the target by the end 
of 2005. Gauteng, the Northern Cape and North West Province had reached 
about 50% of the Operational Plan target by the end of 2005. It is also important 
to note that the increase in the total number of HAART patients in the public 
sector occurred mainly in the two largest (and most HIV affected) provinces: 
KwaZulu-Natal and Gauteng, and to a lesser extent in the next largest provinces 
(Eastern Cape and Western Cape). The provincial allocation of public sector 
HAART patients is shown in Figure 4. 
Figure 4: Provincial Allocation of Public Sector HAART patients: mid 
2004 – end 2005 
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Source: Hassan and Bosch (2006). 
South Africa’s public sector HAART rollout is strongly underpinned by external 
funding and support – especially in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal. As 
shown in Table 2 and Figures 5a and 5b, of the total number of public sector 
HAART patients (111,786), 53.9% were part funded by external donors (the 
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largest being PEPFAR) working in partnership with the public sector. The 
contribution that donors make to public sector patients varies between donors, 
across projects (with some treatment sites being fully funded by donors, and 
others simply obtaining targeted support) and over time.  For example, the first 
public sector, donor project, which was between MSF and the Western Cape 
government, was initially almost entirely funded and managed by MSF, but over 
the past few years, the province has assumed a greater role, with the plan being 
that as of 2007, the sites will be run entirely by the public sector (Naimak 2006).  
However, the Western Cape government also received funding from the Global 
Fund (which was disbursed in October 2004) for six HAART sites including the 
sites it was operating in partnership with MSF. In other words, disentangling the 
relative contributions of donors and the South African government for the public 
sector rollout is a complex business! Unfortunately, neither the donors nor the 
South African public sector provide sufficient data for the relative impacts to be 
unpacked at a national level.  
Table 2: Sources of Funding of HAART Patients 
As of the End of December 2005 Number of 
HAART 
patients 
% of the total 
number of 
HAART patients 
% of the number of 
public sector HAART 
patients 
In the public sector, part funded by ARK and 
MSF* 
13,859 7.2% 12.4% 
In the public sector, part funded by PEPFAR* 30,136 15.6% 27.0% 
In the public sector, part funded by the Global 
Fund** 
16,297 8.4% 14.6% 
In the public sector, fully funded by the state 51,494 26.6% 46.1% 
Total in the public sector* 111,786 57.7% 100% 
    
In not-for-profits (i.e. programmes outside the 
public sector funded by PEPFAR and other 
philanthropists)* 
10,669 5.5%  
In disease management programmes (including 
work place treatment programmes and medical 
insurance schemes) 
56,123 29.0%  
Unfunded (i.e. funded out of pocket by the 
patients themselves)* 
15,000 7.7%  
    
Total number of patients*** 193,579 100%  
Sources: * Hassan and Bosch (2006); ** http://www.theglobalfund.org; ***ASSA2003 demographic model. 
Note: The numbers funded by the state is a derived figure.  The number in disease management programmes is 
back-calculated by subtracting the total number in the public sector from the number of public + private sector 
patients as estimated by ASSA2003.  It thus differs marginally from Hassan and Bosch (2006).   
Donor assistance to the South African public sector is positive insofar as it adds 
to the pool of resources being allocated to HAART.  This is clearly the case in 
the Western Cape, where HAART coverage has exceeded the planned national 
target, and where additional funding was needed from NGOs and the Global 
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Fund to supplement government resources in order to continue the rollout 
(Naimak 2006).   
However, there is a danger that the contribution of donors to the public sector 
HAART rollout has taken the pressure off the national Department of Health to 
ensure that existing, allocated resources from the national Treasury for the 
rollout are being used effectively and appropriately. As discussed below, the 
National Treasury has allocated sufficient resources to the public health sector 
for a HAART rollout – yet these resources are not being fully or appropriately 
utilised, and instead, one of the main driving forces for the public sector rollout 
appears to be external assistance from donors.   
Budgeting for the Public Sector Rollout 
Unfortunately, information regarding national finances on the HAART rollout is 
very opaque, with the available information being limited to the occasional 
cryptic remark in various general budget documents. However, judging from an 
August 2004 Treasury document reviewing government finances (South African 
Treasury 2004), sufficient finances were allocated by the national Treasury to 
provincial governments to fund the Operational Plan. The report states that a 
sum of R300 million had been allocated to the ‘comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
programme, ARV rollout in particular’ for 2004/5 (South African Treasury 
2004).  At this stage, the Treasury would have been working in terms of the 
budget provided by the Operational Plan which proposed to have 54,000 people 
on treatment by March 2004 at a total cost of R296 million (Department of 
Health 2003). This included budgeted allocations for additional staff, laboratory 
testing, antiretroviral drugs, nutritional supplements, health systems upgrading, 
programme management, capital investment and research.  Of course, by late 
2004 (when Treasury finalised its medium-term expenditure framework), it 
would have been clear that the rollout was proceeding far more slowly and, at 
best, was only going to achieve its March 2004 target a year later (as had indeed 
been announced by President Mbeki in his 2004 State of the Nation address 
(Mbeki 2004)). This, together with the fact that antiretroviral drug prices had 
fallen further since the operational plan was budgeted, meant that the allocation 
of R300 million for the 2004/5 financial year was more than sufficient to fund 
the (delayed-by-one-year) planned comprehensive rollout. 
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Figure 5a:  Sources of Funding for HAART Patients (numbers) 
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Figure 5b:  Sources of Funding for HAART Patients (percentages) 
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Yet, by the time March 2005 came along, the rollout was still only at about 80% 
of the original first year’s treatment target (that is, at about 43,000 people).  In 
other words, more money had been allocated by the national Treasury for the 
comprehensive rollout in 2004/5 than had been used by the national and 
provincial health departments for that purpose. Despite this poor showing, the 
Treasury continued to be optimistic and supportive, and allocated enough for 
2005/6 to have 150,000 people on HAART by March 2006 (South African 
Treasury 2005), whilst making the commitment to increase the budget for the 
rollout as it progressed.  
The Treasury’s target of 150,000 HAART patients in the public sector by March 
2006 appears to be spot-on with the achieved level of 111,786 by the end of 
December, 2005.  The national Treasury had, in other words, allocated sufficient 
resources to fund all of these patients. Yet as it turned out, the Global Fund, 
PEPFAR and various other NGO partnerships took the pressure off the South 
African state to such an extent, that only 51,494 HAART patients needed to be 
fully covered by the government budget. If we assume that the average 
contribution of donors to public sector projects is 50% of the total costs (which 
is probably an underestimate given that the Global Fund contributes 
substantially more to the Western Cape by paying for drugs, personnel, 
diagnostic testing and infrastructure (Naimak 2006)), then at least a quarter of 
the budget allocated by the national treasury for the treatment rollout was not 
used for that purpose.   
The Problem of Political Will 
According to a recent assessment by the International Treatment Preparedness 
Coalition (ITPC) of South Africa’s HAART rollout (International Treatment 
Preparedness Coalition 2005), the major constraint is political leadership. The 
analysis presented here supports the ITPC’s contention. It suggests very strongly 
that the overall public sector rollout in South Africa is not constrained by 
budgetary allocations (although it may be in well-performing provinces like the 
Western Cape and to some extent in KwaZulu-Natal) – but is instead 
constrained by ineffective leadership in the national Department of Health and 
in many of the provincial Departments of Health. While it is true that a rapid and 
sustained HAART rollout requires additional investment in, and upgrading of, 
the public health sector, it is important to note that this was all budgeted for in 
the Operational Plan, and, as argued above, existing subsequent allocations for 
the rollout by the national Treasury are consistent with that Operational Plan 
(although revised downwards to account for the slow initial pace of the rollout).  
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Put bluntly, if the national Health Minister had prioritised upgrading the health 
system and rolling out treatment, the Minister of Finance would have provided 
her with the funds and a further 30,000 people (at least) would be on HAART in 
the public sector. If the Ministry of Health had managed to rollout treatment in 
line with the original planned targets (and which were initially budgeted for by 
the National Treasury) then an additional 278,000 people would be on treatment.  
Instead, the Health Minister has yet to chart a way forward to address the human 
resources crisis in the health sector, and has undermined the HAART rollout yet 
further by sending out confusing messages about the relative benefits of 
HAART, nutrition and alternative remedies. 
Rather than actively supporting the HAART rollout, the Health Minister 
consistently points to the benefits of nutritional interventions, and to the side 
effects of antiretroviral drugs, saying that patients must exercise ‘choice’ in their 
treatment strategies (Nattrass 2006b).  This has resulted in AIDS patients being 
reluctant to take HAART because they had heard that antiretrovirals were 
‘poisonous’ and in additional burdens being posed on antiretroviral treatment 
counsellors who find themselves having to dispel myths about AIDS and 
antiretroviral treatment. In addition, the Health Minister’s unfortunate discourse 
of ‘choice’ has created the space for unproven substances to compete with 
antiretrovirals even though their clinical effects are at best unproven. This 
includes the Rath Foundation’s campaign to treat HIV and other chronic 
conditions with high doses of vitamins rather than HAART (Geffen 2005).    
Aside from conspicuously failing to energise the antiretroviral rollout from the 
centre (and sewing confusion with her stance on alternative treatment), the 
Health Minister has undermined the HAART rollout in three other ways.  
Firstly, she has undermined the potential of provinces to apply for and obtain 
funding from the Global Fund. Between June 2002 and August 2003, she 
blocked a Global Fund grant of $72 million to Kwa-Zulu Natal, citing 
procedural irregularities.  Such political interference from the centre undermined 
subsequent applications to the Global Fund (Naimak 2006).  Secondly, as noted 
earlier, she presided over such a slow antiretroviral drug procurement process 
that the final tender was awarded only in March 2005.  As over half of the value 
of the tender was awarded to Abbot Laboratories and MSD (Hassan 2005) 
which had patents on most of the drugs that were being procured, TAC 
demanded that the Minister of Health use her powers under the Patents Act to 
issue compulsory licences to enable local production of generic versions, or the 
importation of generic versions.  As yet, she has failed to act on the matter.  
TAC faced similar frustrations over the health minister’s third apparent delaying 
tactic, her failure to take rapid action with regard to the human resources crisis 
in the health sector – thereby undermining the capacity of the health sector to 
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rollout antiretroviral treatment faster. As far back as 2001, an internal report for 
the Department of Health had identified human resources as the key constraint 
facing the South African public health sector. The 2003 National Health Act 
required the Health Minister to develop a strategic plan for addressing the 
problem.  This, however, only materialised in August 2005 when the 
Department of Health released its ‘Strategic Framework for the Human 
Resources for Health Plan’. However, the document was devoid of priority 
setting, did not set health care worker to patient ratios or grapple with any of the 
reasons why many health care workers were apparently leaving the public health 
sector (Berger and Hassim 2005).  
Have there been ‘Sufficient’ Public Sector 
Resources for the Rollout? 
One of the questions posed by the ongoing human resources problem is whether 
the public sector HAART rollout that has taken place was accompanied by a 
sufficient increase in public sector employment – or whether it acted as a drain 
on existing human resources. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence indicating that 
there is severe pressure on public sector health care professionals as a result of 
the dual pressures of providing HAART and treating AIDS-sick people. For 
example, the Treatment Action Campaign devoted almost an entire issue of their 
magazine, Equal Treatment, to this problem (2005: 1-15). It documented cases 
of severely over-stretched clinics, and interviewed exhausted doctors and nurses 
– many of whom commented that they were depressed by the working 
conditions and tempted to take up offers by foreign and domestic head-hunters 
and leave the public health sector. However, we do not know to what extent the 
anecdotal evidence is representative of the entire country – or to what extent the 
pressure facing public sector workers is a recent phenomenon, rather than 
something they have been living with for some time – particularly those working 
in under-resourced rural areas.    
We do know, however, that the numbers of medical practitioners, professional 
nurses and pharmacists in the public sector increased sharply between 2003 and 
2005. Was this enough to cope with the increased numbers of people on 
HAART? According to the Operational Plan, for every 500 people placed on 
HAART, two extra professional nurses are required, one extra medical 
practitioner and one extra pharmacist (Department of Health 2003). Figure 6 
shows the total increase of such personnel broken down into what was required 
to cope with the HAART rollout that took place, and what was surplus to that 
requirement. The figure indicates that there were, on aggregate, sufficient 
additional key medical and related personnel for the rollout. 
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Figure 6: Increase in the Numbers of Medical Practitioners, Professional 
Nurses and Pharmacists in the Public Health Sector (2003 – 2005) 
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Source: (http://www.hst.org.za/healthstats/98/data). 
However, one needs to consider that the public health sector was simultaneously 
coping with a sharp increase in the already high numbers of AIDS-sick people. 
As shown in Figure 7, there was a sharp growth in the number of AIDS-sick 
people and in the number of people on HAART in the public sector between 
2003 and 2005. We therefore need to re-phrase the question and ask whether the 
increase in the numbers of health care professionals was also sufficient to cope 
with the increase in the numbers of AIDS-sick people.  
The answer to this question depends on how much time these health care 
professionals spent on AIDS-sick individuals, and how much time they spent on 
other public sector health work (for example, delivering babies, emergency 
trauma, geriatric illnesses, non-AIDS related diseases etc).  There is, 
unfortunately, no data available on this, so the best we can do is see how the 
answer to the question ‘was the increase in health care professionals enough?’ 
varies depending on what proportion of their time we assume was spent on 
AIDS-related illnesses in 2003.  
1101 
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Figure 7: AIDS-sick People and the Number of People on HAART in the 
Public Sector 
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Sources: ASSA2003 demographic model; Hassan and Bosch (2006) and AIDS Law Project (2005).  
Figure 8 plots the demand for public sector health care in 2005 net of the 
HAART rollout against various possible proportions of time spent in 2003 on 
AIDS-sick patients. The demand for health care services from non-AIDS related 
cases is assumed to grow at the same rate as the non AIDS-sick population 
(which grew at 1.5% between 2003 and 2005). Thus, if we assume that health 
care professionals in the public sector spent no time in 2003 on AIDS-sick 
people, then the demand for their services (for tasks other than the HAART 
rollout) would have grown by 1.5%, which means that the demand for their 
services in 2005, expressed as an index with 100=2003, would be 101.5 
The horizontal lines in Figure 8 depict the actual growth in the different 
categories of health care workers net of their absorption into the HAART 
programme. In the case of professional nurses, for example, the total number 
rose by 2,096.  Of these, 420 full-time equivalents were needed for the HAART 
programme. This left, net of the rollout, 2,096 – 420 = 1,676 nurses available for 
other duties.  This number of nurses available for non-HAART rollout purposes 
grew by 4% between 2003 and 2005.   
Was this enough?  Figure 8 indicates that this depends on what proportion of 
time these nurses were spending on AIDS-sick cases in 2003.  If they were 
spending 8% (or less) of their time on AIDS-sick people, then this would have 
been enough. However, if AIDS-sick people absorbed more of their time, then 
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the growth in professional nurses was not sufficient.  Applying the same logic to 
medical practitioners and pharmacists, the analysis suggests that the increase in 
doctors was sufficient if they spent less than 32% of their time in 2003 on 
AIDS-sick people, and the number of pharmacists would have been sufficient if 
they had spent 45% or less of their time on AIDS-sick people. Put differently, if 
we assume that health care professionals spent on average about a third of their 
time in 2003 on AIDS-sick cases, then the increase in doctors was about right, 
the increase in pharmacists was more than sufficient, and the increase in nurses 
was seriously inadequate to cope with the demands on their time posed by the 
HAART rollout and the increase in AIDS-sick cases.  If, however, AIDS-sick 
cases accounted for more than half of the workload of all these health care 
workers, then the increase in personnel that took placed between 2003 and 2005 
was not sufficient for the HAART rollout that took place. 
Figure 8: Supply and Demand for Health Care Services Net of the 
HAART Rollout 
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Sources: http://www.hst.org.za/healthstats/98/data, ASSA2003 demographic model and Hassan and Bosch 
(2006).  
This analysis is, of course, relative to the base line situation in 2003.  If the 
public health sector was already over-burdened at that stage (which it probably 
was, given the anecdotal evidence and assessments by consultants), then the 
notion of a ‘sufficient’ increase in health care professionals needs to be suitably 
qualified. For example, growth in the number of professional nurses was 
stagnant between 2000 and 2002 – thus indicating that the base of 2003 was 
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Medical Practitioners 
Pharmacists 
8% 
45% 
32% 
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probably already a situation of serious over-burdening of existing nursing staff 
(Chabikuli et al. 2005).   
One of the biggest ethical questions facing the HAART rollout is the de facto 
rationing that is taking place – particularly in far-flung rural areas which often 
rely on recently graduated South African doctors doing their required two-year 
community service. It may well be the case, on aggregate, that there are 
‘sufficient’ pharmacists and medical practitioners in the South African public 
health system – but if these are based primarily in urban areas (which is likely), 
then the rollout in rural areas is likely to be further constrained. 
Although this analysis raises more questions than answers, a few tentative 
conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the South African public health sector 
has been able to expand the numbers of professional nurses, medical 
practitioners and pharmacists – despite also suffering from persistent attrition 
into the foreign and domestic private sectors. Whether this was ‘sufficient’ to 
cope with the additional burdens being placed on the health care sector by 
AIDS-sick cases and HAART patients, depends on the proportion of time these 
health care workers were spending on AIDS-related work.  There are, however, 
strong grounds for concluding that the number of nurses was, and remains, 
inadequate.  In this respect, it is worrying that only 31.5% of the nurses trained 
in South Africa between 1996 and 2004 registered with the South African 
Nursing Council over the same period (Subedar 2005). This suggests that 
unsustainably large numbers of trained nurses are either choosing not to pursue 
nursing careers in South Africa, or are leaving the country to work abroad. The 
chances of South Africa being able to launch a ‘nurse-centred’ HAART rollout 
in the future, are thus slim.  
It is also worth noting the involvement of donors in relieving the human 
resources problem for the South African HAART rollout. Donors like MSF and 
ARK have flown in medical practitioners from outside the country, but this 
information does not appear in the government’s books (and hence is not 
included in this analysis). Such assistance is, however, unlikely to be sustainable 
in the long-run. There is thus a clear need to ensure that the South African public 
sector can maintain the momentum of the HAART rollout once donor assistance 
drops. Another problem worth noting with donor assistance in the rollout is that 
foreign-funded projects, due to strict reporting requirements and the strong focus 
on numerical targets as assessment tools, tend to deliver HAART through a 
vertical process that is poorly integrated with the rest of the primary health care 
system (Stewart and Loveday 2005). This is problematic given that the HAART 
programme must complement, and be well integrated with, the primary health 
care system if it is to be sustainable.  
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Conclusion 
Human resources, with the exception of nurses, may have been sufficient to 
cope with the HAART rollout that took place in South Africa between 2003 and 
2005.  However, South Africa’s HAART rollout has been slow relative to the 
2003 Operational Plan and substantial numbers of people still require treatment.  
If South Africa was to scale up its programme to address the unmet demand, 
then – unless public sector recruitment can keep pace – human resources will 
constrain the rollout as is happening in other southern African countries (Kober 
et al. 2004). Addressing the human resources crisis in the public health sector 
thus ought to be an important priority for the Health Minister.  
There are strong grounds for concluding that South Africa could have achieved a 
much higher HAART coverage than it has, and that the major constraint on the 
rollout is political will.  The national Treasury has made resources available to 
the Health Minister to facilitate a HAART rollout, yet a significant proportion of 
these resources have not been used for this purpose. The Health Minister 
appears to be undermining, rather than energising the rollout.  A large part of 
South Africa’s failure to achieve a higher HAART coverage must be placed at 
the door of the national Health Minister – and President Mbeki, who at the very 
least is complicit insofar as keeping her in her post.   
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